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1. Introduction 
From 1971 to 2015, the percent of Americans earning twice the median 
income grew by 50%, while the percentage of Americans earning less than two-
thirds the median income experienced a growth rate of 42% (Kocharr et al, 2015); 
hence, the many references made to the vanishing middle class.  Some income 
inequality is expected, and some form of inequality is necessary in a capitalist 
economic system to promote competition and innovation (Reich, 2014).  Reich 
(2014) adds that the pertinent question is not whether income inequality is good 
or bad, but rather the debate is at which point these inequalities become so great 
that they pose a serious threat to our economy, equal opportunity, and our 
democracy.  Sixty-three percent of Americans believe that we are near or have 
already reached that point in America where the unequal distribution of wealth 
poses a threat to society (Gallup, 2016).  
The effects of higher income inequality on decreased social mobility in 
America are of increased concern (Andrews and Leigh, 2009).  Reich (2014) 
estimates that 42 percent of children in America who are born into poverty will 
remain in poverty for the entirety of their lives.  Further, increased levels of 
income inequality are associated with increased youth crime (Elgar et al. 2009; 
and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) and more frequent bullying among 
preadolescents (Elgar et al. 2009). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) estimate that 
there is more conflict between children in countries with higher income 
inequality.  Although this is not a problem unique to the United States, the US has 
the most unequal distribution of wealth among social classes of all developed 
nations in the world (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Reich, 2014). 
Additionally, income inequality is associated with decreased levels of health 
(Kennedy et al. 1998; Muller, 2002; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002; and Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009). Specifically, in areas with higher income inequality, one observes 
lower levels of measured health, lower levels of self-reported health, and 
increased mortality rates (Kennedy et al. 1996).  Each percentage point increase in 
inequality (as measured by the Robin Hood Index1) leads to an increase in total 
mortality of 21.68 deaths per 100,000 in the United States. When the wealth 
distribution is skewed toward high income families, low income families often do 
not have the necessary disposable income to afford treatment or preventative 
care.  Therefore, legislation that decreases income inequality can also improve 
levels of health. 
                                                          
1 Kennedy et al. (1996) define the Robin Hood Index as the portion of the total community income 
that would have to be redistributed (taken from the richer half of the population and given to the 
poorer half) for there to be income uniformity. 
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Conversely, increased spending on healthcare legislation may be beneficial in 
the fight against income inequality in America.  The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was implemented on March 23, 2010.  Since its 
implementation much has been written about its effects on the healthcare market, 
the insurance market, and the market for employment (Antwi et al. 2012; Cantor 
et al. 2012; Collins et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2015; Depew and Bailey, 
2015).  Despite the ACA’s implications on the workforce and access to 
healthcare, little if any research has been conducted to understand the relationship 
between the ACA and income inequality.   
In this paper we estimate the causal effect of the ACA on income inequality; 
thus, beginning the conversation of the potential implications of a wider-range of 
healthcare-related legislation on income inequality.  The remainder of this paper 
is organized as follows: we first complete a thorough review of current literature 
surrounding income inequality.  We then introduce our data, which provides a 
rich set of control variables for our estimation.  We then review our model and 
estimation results, and the final section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Income inequality, often measured using the Gini coefficient2, is the extent to 
which income is distributed in an uneven manner among a population (Gardner 
and Abraham, 2011).  In previous economic literature the Gini coefficient has 
been used to estimate the effects of a variety of demographic, socioeconomic, and 
cultural characteristics on income inequality, including:   education (Sylwester, 
2002; Shugart II et al. 2003; and McMahon 2004; Rehme, 2007; Hojo, 2009; and 
Hasanov and Izraeli 2011), age (Martinson, 2012; Gunasekara et al., 2013; and 
Mather et al., 2014), availability of employment (Apergis et al., 2010; and Wolff, 
2015), teen birth rate (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; and Kearny and Levine, 
2014), accessibility of fringe benefits (Pierce, 2001; and Chung, 2003), crime 
(Patterson, 1991; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993; and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), 
obesity (Gates et al. 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; and Lunborg et al. 2014), 
race (Van der Berg, 2014; and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), and political 
affiliation (Muller, 1985; and Hayashi et al. 2014). The effects of education and 
educational spending on income inequality are mixed.   
Higher educational expenditures have frequently been linked to lower income 
inequality (Sylwester, 2002; Shugart II et al. 2003; and McMahon 2004; Rehme, 
                                                          
2 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2006) defines the Gini coefficient 
as a measure of the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. 
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2007; Hojo, 2009; and Hasanov and Izraeli 2011).  In a cross-sectional analysis of 
multiple countries Sylwester (2002) finds that that allocating one additional 
percentage point of GDP to public education decreases the Gini coefficient by 
0.01. Importantly, Sylwester (2002) finds that the effects to be larger in higher 
income countries.  Further, Hasanov and Izraeli (2011) find that policies 
supporting higher quality education are pivotal in promoting growth and 
improving income gains among the poor.  Additionally, McMahon (2004) 
determines that a two percent increase in educational investments reduces the 
Gini coefficient by eight percent in developed nations.  
Shugart II et al. (2003) find that in societies with higher average levels of 
educational attainment more income is distributed above the median income level.  
Income is more unevenly distributed to the upper class in these societies because 
the income earned for unskilled labor does not considerably differ between 
societies. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that other researchers find the effect of 
educational spending on income inequality to be nonlinear (Rehme, 2007; Hojo, 
2009).  Rehme (2007) finds that an increase in educational spending first 
increases, but subsequently decreases income inequality.  Hojo (2009) adds to the 
literature by proposing that there are diminishing returns to educational spending 
in Japan. 
There exist contradicting theories of the effect of relative age levels on 
inequality in recent economic literature (Martinson, 2012; Gunasekara et al., 
2013; and Mather et al., 2014). Gunasekara et al. (2013) and Mather et al. (2014) 
conclude that income inequality is lower in areas with younger populations and 
higher in areas with older populations.  Specifically, Gunasekara et al. (2013) find 
a causal relationship between younger age groups and lower income inequality in 
Australia and New Zealand.  However, Martinson (2012) states that income 
inequality does not differ among relative age groups in the United States.  
Income inequality has also been found to vary based upon racial 
characteristics.  Societies with higher minority populations have higher income 
inequality (Van der Berg, 2014; and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  In Van der 
Berg’s (2014) study of inequality in South Africa the author finds that income 
inequality is highest in predominately black communities and lowest in 
predominately white communities.  In the United States, income inequality is 
closely related to the proportion of African-Americans in the state’s population 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
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Two important socioeconomic characteristics that affect income inequality are 
employment levels and the availability of fringe benefits.  Higher unemployment 
levels increase income inequality (Apergis et al., 2010; and Wolff, 2015).  
Apergis et al. (2010) conclude that legislation with the intent of decreasing the 
unemployment rate will also decrease income inequality. Wolff (2015) provides 
additional evidence that higher unemployment rates lead to more wealth held by 
those in the highest income bracket.  
Additionally, the lack of employer-provided fringe benefits such as health 
insurance leads to higher income inequality (Pierce, 2001; and Chung, 2003).  
Chung (2003) finds that the lack of benefits for less-skilled workers contributed to 
the rise in income inequality from 1987 – 1994.  Pierce (2001) finds that in 
societies in which lower income workers do not receive fringe benefits income 
inequality is greater than in societies where low income earners receive these 
additional forms of compensation.  Further, Pierce (2001) highlights the 
importance of considering fringe benefits when studying inequality.  
Additional environmental, social, and cultural factors influencing income 
inequality include:  teen pregnancy, crime, obesity, and political affiliation.  
Societies with more teenage pregnancies have higher levels of income inequality 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; and Kearny and Levine, 2014).  Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2009) find a significant and positive correlation between teen birth rates 
and inequality, while Kearny and Levine (2014) suggest reverse or simultaneous 
causality between teen birth rates and income inequality.   
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) find a significant and positive correlation 
between homicides and income inequality, while Hsieh and Pugh (1993) find that 
violent crime has a significant and positive effect on income inequality in the 
United States.  Patterson (1991) finds that crime rates have a significant and 
positive effect on poverty and inequality, which suggests that legislation fighting 
both poverty and inequality may lead to lower crime rates.   
Unhealthy societies also have higher levels of income inequality (Gates et al. 
2008; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; and Lunborg et al. 2014).  Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2009) find a significant and positive relationship between obesity rates 
and income inequality.  This link could be related to the findings of Gates et al. 
(2008), who determine that higher obesity rates lead to lower productivity.  
Individuals who are not obese are more productive on average and earn more than 
those who are obese; thus, increasing income inequality. There is a significant and 
negative relationship between obesity and annual earnings (Lunborg et al., 2014).  
4
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Finally, there is an established link between politics and income inequality 
(Muller, 1985; and Hayashi et al. 2014).  Specifically, how and where political 
figures allocate funds affects income inequality (Hayashi et al., 2014).  
Historically, the two parties in the American political system allocate funds in 
drastically different ways.  Further, countries with increased spending on 
legislation for educational funding experience lower income inequality (Hayahi et 
al., 2014).   
Through a thorough review of the current economic literature surrounding 
income inequality we identify age, ethnicity, and education as demographic 
characteristics that affect income inequality; fringe benefits and employment as 
socioeconomic characteristics that affect income inequality; and teenage 
pregnancy rates, crime, obesity, and political affiliation as societal conditions and 
cultural norms that affect inequality.  We use these aforementioned characteristics 
as control variables in our model as to not overestimate the effect of the ACA on 
income inequality. 
3. Data 
We use a state-level panel data set from 2007 through 2013 to capture a 
symmetrical data set surrounding the first year of implementation of the ACA, 
2010.  We include data from 49 states3, and use the American Community Survey 
to capture our two dependent variables:  the Gini coefficient and percent of 
income earned by the highest income quintile. 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of the extent to which the distribution of 
income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. The coefficient is measured on a zero to one scale in 
which a Gini coefficient of zero denotes perfect income equality and a Gini 
coefficient of one denotes perfect income inequality. For example, if the Gini 
coefficient of New Jersey in a given year is one, then all of the income in New 
Jersey is earned by one individual. If the Gini coefficient of New Jersey in a given 
year is zero, then every income earner in New Jersey earns the exact same income 
in that given year.  Some advantages of using the Gini coefficient as a measure of 
inequality are the accessibility of the data, its widespread use in current literature 
regarding inequality, and its ease of interpretation (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
However, there are limitations to using the Gini coefficient as the only 
measure of inequality.  Specifically, it is possible that two different income 
distributions can have the same Gini coefficient.  Additionally, the Gini 
                                                          
3 We exclude Hawaii due to missing data. 
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coefficient cannot differentiate between a person who has negative income 
because they are a full time college student, and a person who has negative 
income because they are unemployed and not seeking employment.   
For these reasons, we use an additional outcome variable, the percent of total 
gross income earned by the top twenty percent of income earners.  This variable 
provides an alternative measure of income inequality based on direct income 
distribution. This value increases as more income is redistributed from the bottom 
80 percent of income earners to the top 20 percent of income earners, depicting a 
more unequal distribution of wealth, and higher income inequality.  
Our analysis focuses on one variable of interest, the implementation of the 
ACA.  The ACA variable is a binary indicator set to zero for each state from 2007 
through 2009, and one for each state from 2010 through 2013.  
We use the American Community Survey to capture the data for eight 
independent variables. These state-level variables are:  four levels of education, 
median age, median age squared, race, and health insurance coverage. We use the 
highest academic degree obtained by individuals aged 25 or older to represent the 
effect of education on income inequality in our models. We separate educational 
attainment into four categories: less than high school degree, high school degree 
or equivalent, some college or associate’s degree, and bachelor’s degree or higher.   
We include median age to control for age variations in each state, which could 
be related to levels of income inequality (Gunasekara et al., 2013; and Mather et 
al., 2014). We also add median age squared to the models to control for a 
diminishing effect of age on inequality. Further, we include three racial categories 
that represent a percent of the total state population for a given year4 because we 
know there exists a relationship between race and inequality (Van der Berg, 2014; 
and Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
We use the percentage of persons per state who do not have health insurance 
coverage as a proxy to capture the effect of fringe benefits on income inequality.5  
The mean rate of those without health insurance coverage over the entirety of the 
                                                          
4 The Census Bureau data is based on self-identification. They disclose that people may choose to 
report more than one race group. People of any race may be of any ethnic origin. 
5 The Census Bureau does not provide state-level health insurance coverage data for the year 2007. 
For that reason we include a value of 0 for all 49 states represented in 2007.  Therefore, the values 
will not be represented in the regression, and the coefficient will only represent the effect of health 
coverage on inequality from 2008 through 2013.  Our time fixed effects for 2007 capture the fact 
that this variable is missing during 2007. 
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sample is 21.20 percent.  Note that in 2010, the year the ACA was implemented, 
the mean uninsured rate of the sample increases from the year before 
implementation.  This is not surprising as we expect the effects ACA to be 
gradual as we do not expect all qualified individuals will take advantage of a new 
piece of legislation at the time of implementation.   We recognize that it may take 
time to educate the public on the new methods of accessing health insurance, and 
we expect to see the greatest decrease in the uninsured rate the years following 
2010.  This is reflected in our data in the decrease in the uninsured rate from 2011 
to 2013.  In 2013 we recognize the lowest level of uninsured Americans in our 
sample being 20.80 percent.6 
We obtain crime statistics from the website of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which provides national and state-level data on the number of 
arrests each year beginning in 1985.  This data includes different arrest categories 
such as violent crime, rape, property crime, robbery, and total arrests. We choose 
to use total arrests as a percent of the state population as the control variable to 
represent crime in our models.  
Obesity and teen birth rate statistics are from the website of the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which reports national and state level 
obesity rates each year for both adults and teenagers aged 18 and younger, as a 
percentage of the total state population. The CDC defines obesity as having a 
body mass index (BMI) greater than 30.0. The BMI statistics are calculated from 
self-reported weight and height.7  We capture the effect of teen birth rates we 
observe the number of births per 1,000 teenage girls aged 15 through 19.  We 
transform these values into percentages for ease of interpretation. For instance, in 
2007 the mean births per 1000 girls are 40.9. Therefore, the calculated teen birth 
rate is 0.0409.8  
We gather state level unemployment data directly from the regional and state 
unemployment news releases submitted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
We use the December news releases from the years 2007 through 2013 for 
consistency.  The unemployment rate is calculated as the total number of 
                                                          
6 In 2014, now the most recent available data, the uninsured rate in America was 13.4%. 
7 The data is gathered from phone surveys given by The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) which is recognized as one of the nation's top systems of health-related 
telephone surveys. 
8 This value is calculated by dividing the mean births per 1000 girls (40.9) by 1000. 
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unemployed persons in the labor force divided by the total number of persons in 
the civilian labor force9.  
To capture the effect of politics on income inequality we include dummy 
variables representing the political party of the state governor for each given year 
of the sample. The three parties represented in the model are the Republican 
party, Democratic party, and Independent party.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our dependent variables overall, and 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our aforementioned control variables.  
There are some trends we observer over the time period of our study.  First, there 
are increasing levels of educational attainment and obesity, and there are 
declining rates of arrest and teen pregnancy.  Further, there is a consistent decline 
in the unemployment rate through 2013 where it reaches 6.31 percent.10  As 
previously discussed, the percentage of the population without health insurance is 
steadily declining, over the course of the study.  For the entirety of the sample 
56.90 percent of the governors are members of the Republican party, 42.60 
percent of the governors are members of the Democratic party, and 0.60 percent 
of the governors are independent. 
 
Table 1: 
 
  Dependent Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
Mean and Median Income Variation ($100,000's) 0.1669 0.0337 
Gini Coefficient 0.4529 0.0192 
Percent of Income Held by Highest Quintile 0.4905 0.0171 
Percent of Income by Top 5% Earners 0.2123 0.0134 
Number of Observations 343 
 
  
                                                          
9 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008) classifies the civilian labor force as all persons in the 
civilian noninstitutionalized population that are either employed or unemployed but have been 
willing and able to work during a period of four weeks. 
10 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics most recent report on February 5, 2016 the US 
unemployment rate currently resides 4.9 percent.  
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Table 2: 
 
  
Independent Variables: Mean Std. Deviation
No High School Degree 0.1350 0.0352
High School Degree or Equivalent 0.3020 0.0397
Some College or Associates Degree 0.2916 0.0372
Bachelors Degree or Higher 0.2714 0.0479
Median Age 37.5035 2.3212
Median Age Squared 1411.8848 171.3636
Male Population Rate 0.4934 0.0076
Unemployment Rate 0.0716 0.0218
Teen Birth Rate 0.0343 0.0117
Percent of Population with Health Coverage 0.0021 0.0001
Total Arrest Rate 0.0449 0.0116
Drug Related Arrest Rate 0.0051 0.0022
U.S. Citizen Population Rate 0.9047 0.0641
Obesity Rate 0.2766 0.0325
White Population Rate 0.7938 0.1020
Black Population Rate 0.1038 0.0948
All Other Race Population Rate 0.1025 0.0664
Democratic State 0.5685 0.4960
Republican State 0.4257 0.4952
Independent State 0.0058 0.0762
Number of Observations 343
9
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4. Econometric Methods 
We use an OLS model with both state and time fixed effects to determine the 
effect of the ACA on income inequality.  Our most robust specification is as 
follows: 
Yst = β0 + β1ACAst + β2Xst +α1States + α2Timet + ust 
 (1) 
where Yst represents the measure of inequality for state, s, in year, t.   ACAst is our 
variable of interest, which represents the binary variable indicating the presence 
of the ACA.  Xst is a vector of covariates containing the control variables 
identified in Table 2.  We also include state and time fixed effects and an 
idiosyncratic error term. 
 An added complication to disentangling the effects of the ACA on income 
inequality is the individual states’ decisions to expand Medicaid during this time 
period.  We run an additional set of specifications in which we include the binary 
indicator for Medicaid expansion using the following model:   
Yst = β0 + β1ACAst +β2Medicaids + β2Xst +α1States + α2Timet + ust         
 (2) 
 
5. Results 
5.1.Outcome Variable One: Gini Coefficient 
The Results in Table 3 include estimated effects using equation (1). The 
dependent variable in all five columns is the Gini coefficient. In column one, our 
results indicate that the implementation of the ACA has a positive and statistically 
significant effect (at the one percent level) on the Gini coefficient.  The results 
indicate that the implementation of the ACA accounts for a 0.006 unit increase in 
the Gini coefficient. Although the coefficient is highly significant, the results are 
not consistent with our hypothesis that the ACA would decrease income 
inequality.  Instead the coefficient suggests the opposite.  One reason for this may 
be because requiring low income workers to purchase health insurance on the 
open market has the potential to decrease their disposable after-tax income.  
Because the mandate aims to provide affordable care to low-income earners its 
effects may be relatively larger on low-income earners than high-income earners.  
This ultimately may lead to increased income inequality. However, as we mention 
in the literature review and data section, the ACA is not the only variable that 
10
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affects income inequality.  Therefore, we recognize that this model suffers from 
omitted variable bias. Additionally, the R-Squared of the regression illustrates that 
the independent variable accounts for only 2.10 percent of the variation of the 
dependent variable. 
Column two shows the results in which we add additional controls for the 
effect education on income inequality.  Again, we observe a significant (at the one 
percent level) and positive effect of the ACA on the Gini coefficient.  The results 
indicate that the ACA accounts for a 0.011 unit increase in inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient.  However, we know from our review of the 
economic literature that the ACA and education are not the only variables that 
affect our dependent variable (Muller, 1985; Patterson, 1991; Hsieh and Pugh, 
1993; Pierce, 2001; Chung, 2003; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Apergis et al. 
2010; Martinson, 2012; Gunasekara et al. 2013; Kearny and Levine, 2014; 
Lunborg et al. 2014; Mather et al. 2014; Hayashi et al. 2014; Van der Berg, 2014; 
and Wolff, 2015).  We recognize that this model also suffers from omitted 
variable bias.  However, we notice that the addition of the education variables to 
our specification lead to a significantly increased R-squared; our independent 
variables now account for 67.50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Column three shows the results in which we include additional control 
variables for age, employment, teen birth rate, insurance coverage, crime, obesity, 
race, and political affiliation. It is imperative that we include all of these variables 
in the model to insure an unbiased estimate of the effect of the ACA on the 
dependent variable because, as previously discussed, all of these variables have 
been identified as contributors to given levels of inequality (Muller, 1985; 
Patterson, 1991; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993; Pierce, 2001; Sylwester, 2002; Chung, 
2003; Shugart II et al. 2003; McMahon 2004; Rehme, 2007; Hojo, 2009; 
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Apergis et al. 2010; Hasanov and Izraeli 2011; 
Martinson, 2012; Gunasekara et al. 2013; Kearny and Levine, 2014; Lunborg et 
al. 2014; Mather et al. 2014; Hayashi et al. 2014; Van der Berg, 2014; and Wolff, 
2015). When we include all observable characteristics, we continue to observe a 
positive relationship between the passage of the ACA and the Gini coefficient that 
is statistically significant, although at a slightly reduced significance level of five 
percent.  These results indicate that the implementation of the ACA accounts for a 
0.005 unit increase in the Gini coefficient, which is a 1.32 percent increase when 
compared to the mean of the sample.  With the inclusion of all observable control 
variables, our linear model accounts for 73.20 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable.  
State fixed effects control for the variation in the dependent variable that can 
be explained by characteristics or changes that are specific to each state in the 
11
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model while holding all else constant.  Time fixed effects capture the variation in 
the dependent variable that is explained by changes that are specific to each year 
in the model. 
Column four shows the results, which include state fixed effects and column 
five shows the results, which include both state and time fixed effects.  When 
controlling for state fixed effects, we observe a negative and statistically 
significant (at the one percent level) effect of the ACA on the Gini Coefficient.  
This result holds when additionally controlling for time fixed effects.  The results 
for both equations indicate that the implementation of the ACA accounts for a 
0.003 unit (or a 0.67 percent when compared to the mean) decrease in the Gini 
coefficient. Our fourth and fifth linear models account for 98.3 and 98.4 percent 
of the variation in the dependent variable, respectively. 
The results from these models are interesting in the fact that we observe a 
decrease in magnitude each time we add additional control variables, as well as a 
change in the sign of the coefficient when controlling for state and time fixed 
effects.  The ACA coefficient transitions from having a significant and positive 
effect on inequality to having a negative effect that is still significant at the one 
percent level, as we add additional control variables for observable and 
unobservable characteristics affecting inequality.  We determine that the fifth 
column represents our most robust specification as we control for the most 
significant observable characteristics affecting income inequality, in addition to 
controlling for unobservable characteristics at the year and state level.  Based on 
our various specifications, we conclude that the implementation of the ACA has 
resulted in a 0.67 percent decrease in income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. In the next section we extend our results by using an alternative 
measure of inequality.  
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Table 1:
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 OLS 5
Affordable Care Act 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.004** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High School Graduate -0.428*** -0.428*** -0.212** -0.126
(0.024) (0.038) (0.085) (0.085)
Associate's Degree -0.539*** -0.441*** 0.134* 0.115
(0.021) (0.030) (0.072) (0.070)
Bachelor's Degree -0.284*** -0.252*** 0.179** 0.211**
(0.019) (0.035) (0.088) (0.088)
Median Age 0.012*** 0.007 0.011**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Median Age Squared -0.0001** -0.00003 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment Rate -0.026 -0.025* -0.082***
(0.036) (0.015) (0.020)
Teen Birth Rate 0.245** -0.199** -0.284***
(0.116) (0.100) (0.102)
Uninsured Rate 0.012 -0.002 -0.002
(0.015) (0.006) (0.012)
Total Arrests as Percent of Population -0.247*** -0.038 -0.031
(0.062) (0.047) (0.046)
Obesity Rate 0.008 0.051*** 0.043***
(0.032) (0.015) (0.015)
Percent Black 0.026** 0.467*** 0.476***
(0.010) (0.097) (0.095)
Percent Other Race 0.008 0.003 -0.017
(0.013) (0.034) (0.033)
Democratic Governor 0.001 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Independent Governor -0.006 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.450*** 0.810*** 0.512*** 0.192 0.074
(0.002) (0.016) (0.081) (0.133) (0.133)
State No No No Yes Yes
Time No No No No Yes
R 0.1430 0.8220 0.8570 0.9910 0.9920
R Square 0.0210 0.6750 0.7350 0.9830 0.9840
Adjusted R Square 0.0180 0.6710 0.7230 0.9790 0.9800
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.0191 0.0110 0.0101 0.0028 0.0027
Significance Levels:
0.01 level: ***
0.05 level: **
0.10 level: *
Gini Coefficient
Table 3: 
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5.2. Outcome Variable Two: Top 20 Percent Income Earners 
Similar to the results in Table 3, the results in Table 4 include estimated 
effects from multiple specifications of equation (1). However, the dependent 
variable is the percent of income earned by the highest quintile of income earners.  
We find a similar pattern to our results in columns one through five, as with 
our previous dependent variable.  The results in column one indicate that the 
implementation of the ACA accounts for a 0.5 percentage point increase in the 
percent of income earned by the highest quintile of income earners.  When we add 
controls for education, shown in column two, we find that the ACA accounts for a 
0.9 percentage point increase in the dependent variable.   With additional controls 
for observable characteristics, column three shows that the implementation of the 
ACA results in a 0.4 percentage point increase in the dependent variable or a 0.82 
percent increase when compared to the mean.  The independent variables in this 
linear model account for 73.20 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Columns four and five show our results that are robust to unobservable 
characteristics at the state and year level.  These results indicate that the 
implementation of the ACA accounts for a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the 
dependent variable, or a 0.67 percent decrease in the percent of income held by 
the top 20 percent of earners when compared to the mean of the sample.  Our 
fourth and fifth linear models both account for 97 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable, respectively. 
The results from these models confirm our original findings that the ACA has 
a significant and negative effect on income inequality.  According to the results of 
our models, the passage of the ACA resulted in a 0.67 percent decrease in the 
Gini coefficient (significant at the one percent level) and a 0.61 percent decrease 
in the percent of total income earned by America’s top income quintile 
(significant at the five percent level).  With these results we are able to estimate 
that roughly $12.9 billion11 of wealth that was redistributed from the top 20 
percent of income earners to the bottom 80 percent of income earners can be 
attributed to the implementation of the ACA.  In the next section of this paper we 
extend our results by adding Medicaid expansion as an additional control variable. 
                                                          
11 In 2013 the median annual income earned by the top 20 percent of household earners was 
$186,352.  We multiply $186,532 by the coefficient -0.003 and determine that $560 is the average 
reduction in household earnings in the top 20 percent of income earners.  We then multiply $560 
by the number of 2013 households held by the top 20 percent (23,122,043 households).  We 
determine that $12,948,344,192 is the total wealth redistributed from the top 20 percent of income 
earners to the bottom 80 percent. 
14
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/19
 
 
Table 4: 
 
 
 
  
Table 2:
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 OLS 5
Affordable Care Act 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.004** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High School Graduate -0.365*** -0.388*** -0.040 -0.050
(0.024) (0.037) (0.139) (0.144)
Associate's Degree -0.455*** -0.384*** 0.230* 0.236**
(0.020) (0.029) (0.118) (0.119)
Bachelor's Degree -0.232*** -0.230*** 0.322** 0.326**
(0.018) (0.035) (0.145) (0.149)
Median Age 0.008* 0.012 0.011
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Median Age Squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment Rate -0.062* -0.075*** -0.067**
(0.035) (0.024) (0.034)
Teen Birth Rate 0.204* -0.144 -0.144
(0.115) (0.164) (0.173)
Uninsured Rate 0.011 -0.007 -0.002
(0.015) (0.009) (0.020)
Total Arrests as Percent of Population -0.203*** -0.059 0.059
(0.061) (0.078) (0.078)
Obesity Rate -0.013 0.040 0.041
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025)
Percent Black 0.025** 0.309* 0.312*
(0.010) (0.159) (0.161)
Percent Other Race 0.006 -0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.055) (0.056)
Democratic Governor 0.001 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Independent Governor -0.012* -0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.488*** 0.791*** 0.612*** 0.034 0.043
(0.001) (0.016) (0.079) (0.218) (0.226)
State No No No Yes Yes
Time No No No No Yes
R 0.1460 0.7850 0.8210 0.9700 0.9700
R Square 0.0210 0.6160 0.6740 0.9410 0.9410
Adjusted R Square 0.0180 0.6120 0.6590 0.9270 0.9270
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.0169 0.0106 0.0100 0.0046 0.0046
Significance Levels:
0.01 level: ***
0.05 level: **
0.10 level: *
Percent of Income held by Top Quintile
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5.3.Inclusion of Medicaid Expansion Indicators 
The results in Table 5 correspond with equations (2) in which we include the 
states’ decisions to expand Medicaid as an additional control variable in order to 
capture any supplemental effect of the healthcare reform on inequality.  The 
dependent variable in all five specifications is the Gini coefficient, and additional 
controls for observable and unobservable characteristics are sequentially added, as 
in the previous tables.  In column one, we observe that the implementation of the 
ACA accounts for a 0.009 unit increase in the Gini coefficient. Although the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level, the corresponding 
sign does not match our hypothesis that the ACA decreases income inequality.  
However, as in our past discussions we recognize that this initial model suffers 
from omitted variable bias. 
As we progress through our specifications when adding all additional 
observable regressors we note the continued decrease in the magnitude of the 
effects of the ACA on income inequality.  In our preferred specification as 
modeled with all observable control variables and time and state fixed effects, 
represented in column five, we find that the ACA accounts for a 0.003 unit 
decrease in the Gini coefficient.  This result is consistent with our initial estimated 
effect and shows the sustained effect of the ACA on income inequality, even 
when controlling for supplemental effects of the healthcare reform on inequality. 
The results in Table 6 show the effects of the ACA on the income inequality, 
as measured by the share of income held by the top income quintile using 
equation (2).  We find a similar trend in our coefficient estimates as with the 
estimated effects of the ACA in Tables 3 through 5.  The results in column five 
are of our preferred specification as modeled by equation (2) and indicate that the 
ACA accounts for a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the dependent variable.   
These additional estimated effects on our two measures of income inequality 
support our initial findings that the ACA decreases income inequality.  We note 
that when additionally controlling for the effects of Medicaid expansion there is 
no loss in significance or magnitude of the ACA when using the Gini coefficient 
as the dependent variable. We observe a decrease of 0.1 percentage points in the 
estimated coefficient of the ACA when using the percent of income held by the 
top income quintile as the dependent variable, but this effect remains statistically 
significant at the five percent level.  These results provide additional confidence 
to our original conclusion that the ACA does decrease income inequality. 
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Table 3:
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 OLS 5
Affordable Care Act 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Medicaid Expansion Year 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High School Graduate -0.424*** -0.421*** -0.205** -0.118
(0.024) (0.029) (0.083) (0.083)
Associate's Degree -0.532*** -0.438*** 0.158** 0.138**
(0.020) (0.029) (0.071) (0.069)
Bachelor's Degree -0.291*** -0.260*** 0.112 0.139
(0.019) (0.034) (0.089) (0.088)
Median Age 0.013*** 0.007 0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Median Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.00004 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment Rate -0.024 -0.021 -0.079***
(0.035) (0.015) (0.020)
Teen Birth Rate 0.201* -0.203** -0.285***
(0.115) (0.098) (0.100)
Uninsured Rate 0.016 -0.001 -0.003
(0.015) (0.005) (0.011)
Total Arrests as Percent of Population -0.233*** -0.027 -0.021
(0.061) (0.047) (0.045)
Obesity Rate 0.001 0.044*** 0.035**
(0.032) (0.096) (0.015)
Percent Black 0.027*** 0.444*** 0.452***
(0.010) (0.096) (0.093)
Percent Other Race 0.004 0.004 -0.017
(0.013) (0.033) (0.033)
Republican Governor 0.0001 0.001** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Independent Governor -0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.809*** 0.809*** 0.498*** 0.194 0.077
(0.016) (0.016) (0.079) (0.130) (0.131)
State No No No Yes Yes
Time No No No No Yes
R 0.2380 0.8320 0.8570 0.9920 0.9920
R Square 0.0560 0.6920 0.7350 0.9830 0.9810
Adjusted R Square 0.0510 0.6880 0.7230 0.9790 0.9810
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.0187 0.0107 0.0101 0.0028 0.0027
Significance Levels:
0.01 level: ***
0.05 level: **
0.10 level: *
Gini Coefficient
Table 5:  
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Table 4:
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 OLS 5
Affordable Care Act 0.003* 0.008*** 0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Medicaid Expansion Year 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High School Graduate -0.361*** -0.381*** -0.033 -0.043
(0.023) (0.037) (0.139) (0.144)
Associate's Degree -0.448*** -0.381*** 0.252** 0.256**
(0.019) (0.029) (0.118) (0.119)
Bachelor's Degree -0.239*** -0.238*** 0.260* 0.262*
(0.018) (0.034) (0.148) (0.152)
Median Age 0.009** 0.012 0.012
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Median Age Squared -0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment Rate -0.060* -0.071*** -0.064*
(0.035) (0.024) (0.034)
Teen Birth Rate 0.160 -0.148 -0.145
(0.113) (0.163) (0.173)
Uninsured Rate 0.015 -0.006 -0.003
(0.014) (0.009) (0.020)
Total Arrests as Percent of Population -0.188*** 0.068 0.068
(0.060) (0.078) (0.078)
Obesity Rate -0.020 0.033 0.034
(0.030) (0.025) (0.026)
Percent Black 0.027*** 0.288* 0.290*
(0.010) (0.159) (0.161)
Percent Other Race 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.012) (0.055) (0.056)
Republican Governor -0.001 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Independent Governor -0.012 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.488*** 0.790*** 0.599*** 0.037 0.037
(0.001) (0.015) (0.078) (0.217) (0.217)
State No No No Yes Yes
Time No No No No Yes
R 0.2540 0.7990 0.8300 0.9700 0.9700
R Square 0.0640 0.6390 0.6890 0.9410 0.9410
Adjusted R Square 0.0590 0.6330 0.6730 0.9280 0.9270
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.0165 0.0103 0.0097 0.0046 0.0046
Significance Levels:
0.01 level: ***
0.05 level: **
0.10 level: *
Percent of Income held by Top Quintile
Table 6:  
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6. Conclusion 
We find that the implementation of the ACA has a significant and negative 
effect on income inequality.  In this paper we focus on two measures of 
inequality: The Gini coefficient and the percent of wealth held by the highest 
income quintile.  We estimate that the ACA decreases the Gini coefficient by 0.67 
percent and decreases the percent of wealth held by the highest income quintile by 
0.61 percent.  Furthermore, this indicates that the ACA accounts for a 
redistribution of approximately $13 billion from the top 20 percent of income 
earners to the bottom 80 percent of income earners. 
We control for the effects of education, age, employment, teen pregnancy, 
insurance coverage, crime, obesity, race, and politics to provide an un-biased 
estimate of the effect of the ACA on either of our dependent variables.  
Additionally, we control for both state and time fixed effects in our most robust 
specifications, which account for more than 99 percent of the variation in the Gini 
coefficient, and 97 percent of the variation in the percent of income held by the 
highest income quintile.  Furthermore, the causal relationship holds true when 
controlling for the supplemental effect of healthcare reform measured by 
Medicaid expansion. 
We also recognize the limitations of our model.  Because our variable of 
interest, the ACA is a binary variable, these results indicate the effect of the ACA 
as linear and do not account for possible diminishing effects over 
time.  Additionally, if we depend solely on the results of our OLS model, we still 
risk the possibility of having biased estimates of the effect of the ACA on 
inequality due to possible endogeneity issues such as omitted variable bias and/or 
simultaneous causality.  Furthermore, even if we are to account for all required 
control variables the linear specifications of OLS could be incorrect (Reynolds 
and DesJardius, 2009).  By depending solely on OLS specifications, even if we 
account for all necessary control variables in this model we may overestimate the 
effect of the variable of interest by saying that the ACA has a linear relationship 
with inequality.  However, we feel that we have identified a robust model that 
captures the effect of the ACA on income inequality. 
These results, showing the effect the ACA has on income inequality, have 
important policy implications.  Specifically, that legislation supporting additional 
healthcare reform can assist in the fight against income inequality. We are able to 
add to the ongoing discussion of income inequality in the economic literature.  
Moreover, this paper is seminal work in studying the implications of the ACA and 
its effect on income inequality.  In subsequent analysis we suggest testing 
additional dependent variables to support our findings.  We also suggest using a 
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continuous variable as the variable of interest, such as the percent of the 
population without health insurance. Furthermore, we believe our results may 
prove to be conservative estimates of the actual effects of the ACA on inequality.  
The effect of the individual mandate would be captured when including data from 
succeeding years in the dataset.12  If so, the increased magnitude of the coefficient 
would only further support our findings that effective healthcare legislation can 
aid in the fight against income inequality.  
                                                          
12 Effective January 1, 2014: under the law, most individuals who can afford it are required to 
obtain basic health insurance coverage or pay a fee to help offset the costs of caring for uninsured 
Americans.  If affordable coverage is not available to an individual, he or she is eligible for an 
exemption (ASPA, 2015). 
20
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/19
 
 
References 
Abraham, J. M., & Feldman, R. (2010). What Will Happen if Employers Drop  
Health Insurance? A Simulation of Employees’ Willingness to Purchase 
Insurance in the Individual Market. National Tax Journal, 63(2), 191-214. 
Andrews, D., & Leigh, A. (2009). More Inequality, Less Social Mobility. Applied  
Economics Letters, 16(15), 1489-1492. 
Antwi, Y. A., Moriya, A. S., & Simon, K. (2012). Effects of Federal Policy to  
Insure Young Adults: Evidence from the 2010 Affordable Care Act 
Dependent Coverage Mandate (No. w18200). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Apergis, N., Dincer, O., & Payne, J. (2010). The Relationship Between  
Corruption and Income Inequality in U.S. States: Evidence from a Panel 
Cointegration and Error Correction Model. Public Choice, 145(1/2), 125-
135. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9557-1 
Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs (ASPA). (2015). Key Features of the  
Affordable Care Act by Year. Retrieved May 02, 2016. 
Atems, B. (2013). A Note on the Differential Regional Effects of Income  
Inequality: Emperical Evidence Using U.S. County-Level Data. Journal of 
Regional Science, 53(4), 656-671. doi:10.1111/jors.12053 
Auerbach, D. I., & Kellermann, A. L. (2011). A Decade of Health Care Cost  
Growth has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for an Average US Family. 
Health Affairs, 30(9), 1630-1636. 
Baffoe-Bonnie, J. (2009). Black–White Wage Differentials in a Multiple Sample  
Selection Bias Model. Atlantic Economic Journal, 37(1), 1-16. 
doi:10.1007/s11293-008-9150-x 
Baicker, K., & Chandra, A. (2006). The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health  
Insurance Premiums.  
Begley, S., & Humer, C. (2015, June 17). No Ready Fix if Obamacare Subsidies  
are Lost: Policy experts. Reuters. 
Blavin, F. E., Buettgens, M., & Roth, J. (2012). State Progress Toward Health  
Reform Implementation: Slower Moving States Have Much to Gain. 
Urban Institute. 
BLS Glossary. (2008, February 28). Retrieved February 01, 2016, from  
http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm 
Buchmueller, T., Carey, C., & Levy, H. (2013). Will Employers Drop Health  
Insurance Coverage Because Of The Affordable Care Act? Health 
Affairs,1522-1530. 
Buettgens, M., Dorn, S., & Carroll, C. (2011). Consider Savings as Well as Costs.  
The Urban Institute, 18. 
Burkhauser, R. V., Larrimore, J., & Simon, K. (2013). Measuring the Impact of  
21
Mindo: Obamacare and the Fight Against Income Inequality
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 
 
Valuing Health Insurance on Levels and Trends in Inequality and How the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 Could Affect Them. Contemporary 
Economic Policy, 31(4), 779-794. 
Burkhauser, R. V., Lyons, S., & Simon, K. I. (2011). The Importance of the  
Meaning and Measurement of “Affordable" in the Affordable Care Act 
(No. w17279). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Cantor, J. C., Monheit, A. C., DeLia, D., & Lloyd, K. (2012). Early Impact of the  
Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage of Young Adults. 
Health Services Research, 47(5), 1773-1790. 
Carpenter, C. E. (2011). Federal Health Reform's Impact on Employer-Sponsored  
Health Insurance. Journal of Financial Service Professionals, 65(2). 
Chen, J., Bustamante, A. V., & Tom, S. E. (2015). Health Care Spending and  
Utilization by Race/Ethnicity Under the Affordable Care Act’s Dependent 
Coverage Expansion. American Journal of Public Health, (0), e1-e9. 
Chung, W. (2003). Fringe Benefits and Inequality in the Labor Market. Economic  
Inquiry, 41(3), 517. 
Collins, S. R., Rasmussen, P. W., Garber, T., & Doty, M. M. (2013). Covering  
Young Adults Under the Affordable Care Act: The Importance of 
Outreach and Medicaid Expansion: Findings from the Commonwealth 
Fund Health Insurance Tracking Survey of Young  
Adults, 2013. Issue Brief (Commonwealth Fund), 21, 1-15. 
Corak, M. (2013). Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and  
Intergenerational Mobility. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 
79-102. 
Carpenter, C. E. (2011). Federal Health Reform's Impact on Employer-Sponsored  
Health Insurance. Journal of Financial Service Professionals, 65(2). 
Deegan, M., Terizzi, S., & Mathews, L. (2015). Regional and Urban Health  
Under Health Care Reform: Estimating the Effects of the Affordable Care 
Act on Health Equity. 
Depew, B., & Bailey, J. (2015). Did the Affordable Care Act's Dependent  
Coverage Mandate Increase Premiums? Journal of Health Economics, 41, 
1-14.  
Elgar, F. J., Craig, W., Boyce, W., Morgan, A., & Vella-Zarb, R. (2009). Income  
Inequality and School Bullying: Multilevel Study of Adolescents in 37 
Countries. Journal of Adolescent Health, 45(4), 351-359. 
Fry, R., & Kochhar, R. (2014). America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-Income  
and Upper-Income Families is Widest on Record. Fact Tank: News in the 
Numbers. 
Gardner, Marcie, Abraham. (2011) "Income Inequality | Inequality.org."  
Inequalityorg. Web. 7. 
  
22
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/19
 
 
Gates, D. M., Succop, P., Brehm, B. J., Gillespie, G. L., & Sommers, B. D. 2008).  
Obesity and Presenteeism: The Impact of Body Mass Index on Workplace 
Productivity. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 
50(1), 39-45. 
Gelman, A., Kenworthy, L., & Su, Y. (2010). Income Inequality and Partisan  
Voting in the United States. Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell), 
91(5), 1203-1219. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00728.x 
Gruber, J. (2011). The Impacts of the Affordable Care Act: How Reasonable Are  
the Projections? (No. w17168). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gunasekara, F. I., Carter, K. N., Crampton, P., & Blakely, T. (2013). Income and  
Individual Deprivation as Predictors of Health Over Time. International 
Journal of Public Health, 58(4), 501-511. 
Hasanov, F., & Izraeli, O. (2011). Income Inequality, Economic Growth, and the  
Distribution of Income Gains: Evidence from the United States. Journal of 
Regional Science, 51(3), 518-539. 
Hayashi, M., Kataoka, M., & Akita, T. (2014). Expenditure Inequality in  
Indonesia, 2008–2010: A Spatial Decomposition Analysis and the Role of 
Education. Asian Economic Journal, 28(4), 389-411. 
Holahan, J., & Garrett, B. (2011). How Will the Affordable Care Act Affect  
Jobs?. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Hojo, M. (2009). Inequality in Japanese Education: Estimation Using the Gini  
Education Coefficient. Japanese Economy, 36(3), 3-27. 
Hsieh, C. C., & Pugh, M. D. (1993). Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent  
Crime: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies. Criminal 
Justice Review, 18(2), 182-202. 
Kearney, M. S., & Levine, P. B. (2014). Income Inequality and Early Nonmarital  
Childbearing. Journal of Human Resources, 49(1), 1-31. 
Kennedy, B. P., Kawachi, I., & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1996). Income distribution  
and Mortality: Cross Sectional Ecological Study of the Robin Hood Index 
in the United States. Bmj, 312(7037), 1004-1007. 
Kochhar, R., Rohal, M., & Fry, R. (2015). The American Middle Class Is Losing  
Ground. Retrieved January 11, 2016. 
Kowalski, A. (2014). The Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act State-by-State.  
SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal. 
Lundborg, P., Nystedt, P., & Rooth, D. (2014). Body Size, Skills, and Income:  
Evidence From 150,000 Teenage Siblings. Demography, 51(5), 1573-
1596. doi:10.1007/s13524-014-0325-6 
Martinson, M. L. (2012). Income Inequality in Health at All Ages: A Comparison  
of the United States and England. American Journal of Public Health, 
102(11), 2049-2056. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2012.300929 
  
23
Mindo: Obamacare and the Fight Against Income Inequality
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
 
 
Mulligan, C. B., & Gallen, T. S. (2013). Wedges, Wages, and Productivity Under  
the Affordable Care Act (No. w19771). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Newport, F. (2015). Americans Continue to Say U.S. Wealth Distribution Is  
Unfair. Retrieved April 13, 2016, from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182987/americans-continue-say-wealth-
distribution-unfair.aspx 
Hojo, M. (2009). Inequality in Japanese Education: Estimation Using the Gini  
Education Coefficient. Japanese Economy, 36(3), 3-27. 
Martinson, M. L. (2012). Income Inequality in Health at all Ages: A Comparison  
of the United States and England. American Journal of Public Health, 
102(11), 2049-2056. 
Mather, T., Banks, E., Joshy, G., Bauman, A., Phongsavan, P., & Korda, R. J.  
(2014). Variation in Health Inequalities According to Measures of 
Socioeconomic Status and Age. Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Public Health, 38(5), 436-440. doi:10.1111/1753-6405.12239 
McMahon, W. W. (2004). The Social and External Benefits of Education.  
International Handbook on the Economics of Education, 211-259. 
Muller, E. N. (1985). Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political  
Violence. American Sociological Review, 47-61. 
Newport, F. (2015). Americans Continue to Say U.S. Wealth Distribution Is  
Unfair. Retrieved April 28, 2016. 
Patterson, E. B. (1991). Poverty, Income Inequality, and Community crime rates.  
Criminology, 29(4), 755-776. 
Pierce, B. (2001). Compensation inequality. quarterly Journal of Economics,  
1493-1525.Race. (n.d.). Retrieved February 01, 2016, from 
http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race.html 
Rehme, G. (2007). Education, Economic Growth and Measured Income  
Inequality. Economica, 74(295), 493-514. 
Reich, R. (2014). How to Shrink Inequality. The Nation.  
Reich, R. B. (2014). Inequality for All. NonStop Entertainment. 
Reynolds, C. L., & DesJardins, S. L. (2009). The Use of Matching Methods in  
Higher Education Research: Answering Whether Attendance at a 2-Year 
Institution Results in Differences in Educational Attainment. In Higher 
Education: Handbook of Theory and Research (pp. 47-97). Springer 
Netherlands. 
Richardson, C. J. (2009). Mandatory Health Insurance: Lessons from  
Massachusetts. Cato Journal, 29(2). 
Shughart II, W. F., Tollison, R. D., & Yan, Z. (2003). Rent Seeking into the  
Income Distribution. Kyklos, 56(4), 441-456. doi:10.1046/j.0023-
5962.2003.00232.x 
24
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/19
 
 
Sommers, B. D., Baicker, K., & Epstein, A. M. (2012). Mortality and Access to  
Care Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 367(11), 1025-1034. 
Sommers, B. D., Buchmueller, T., Decker, S. L., Carey, C., & Kronick, R. (2013).  
The Affordable Care Act Has Led to Significant Gains in Health Insurance 
and Access to Care for Young Adults. Health affairs, 32(1), 165-174. 
Sommers, B. D., Gunja, M. Z., Finegold, K., & Musco, T. (2015). Changes in  
Self-Reported Insurance Coverage, Access to Care, and Health Under the 
Affordable Care Act. JAMA, 314(4), 366-374. 
Sturm, R., & Gresenz, C. R. (2002). Relations of Income Inequality and Family  
Income to Chronic Medical Conditions and Mental Health Disorders: 
National Survey. Bmj, 324(7328), 20. 
Sylwester, K. (2002). Can Education Expenditures Reduce Income Inequality?.  
Economics of Education Review, 21(1), 43-52. 
Taylor, M., & Calhoun, R. (2015). Total Transformation: How ACA Is Driving  
Changes in the Provider Landscape. Benefits Quarterly, 31(1), 15. 
Van der Berg, S. (2014). Inequality, Poverty and Prospects for Redistribution.  
Development Southern Africa, 31(2), 
197218.doi:10.1080/0376835X.2013.871196 
Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2010). The Spirit Level. Why Greater Equality  
Makes Societies Stronger. 
Wolff, E. N. (2015). Inequality and Rising Profitability in the United States,  
1947–2012. International Review of Applied Economics, 29(6), 741-769. 
doi:10.1080/02692171.2014.956704 
 
25
Mindo: Obamacare and the Fight Against Income Inequality
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016
